illustrates how some armies planned and executed operations to the smallest detail (Detailed Command) while other armies allowed commanders to improvise execution (Mission Command). This paper then explores how a specific organizational systems theory by Charles Perrow can help explain why some military operations are appropriate for Detailed Command, and others are suited to Mission Command. Current Army doctrine accounts for both of these concepts in the Art of Command and the Science of Control, but lacks a proper model to assist commanders in determining how to correctly apply the concepts based on the operational environment. The paper concludes with a recommendation that the Army develop organizational systems theory into a tool to help commanders understand how the Art of Command and Science of Control should best be applied on the battlefield.
Organizational Systems Theory and Command and Control Concepts
Army commanders apply the mission command philosophy to balance the Art of Command and the Science of Control ... The Science of Control is based on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis.. what is now labeled as "Detailed Command" for control of their armies; this method was appropriate because weapon ranges were short, formations were compact, the commander could see most of the battlefield, his army, and the army of his enemy, and battles rarely lasted past sundown. 3 However, following the French Revolution and the levée en masse, war grew larger and more complex, resulting in changes to the traditional methods of Command and Control as commanders allowed their subordinate leaders more freedom of action. 4 The U.S. Army's current version of Mission Command is defined as the "exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations." 16 This command concept recognizes the human dimension of war and attempts to find a human solution to complex operational challenges. 17 Mission Command recognizes the enemy is not an inanimate object, but another independent force that actively resists and has its own goals and intent.
Recognizing that the Army's enemies are adaptive, that the civilians on the battlefield are changing in their perceptions and allegiances, and that friendly commander cannot possibly predict all that will happen or what effects a particular action will cause, is a major change from the Jomanian concept of "war as a science". Course of Action (COA) for implementation. 21 Commanders still develop detailed plans, but they "describe" rather than "order" their staffs and subordinate commanders. method to use based on the situation. 24 Detailed Command centralizes information and decision making authority; orders and plans are specific and detailed as they attempt to impose order and certainty on the battlefield. Mission Command, the Army's preferred . These works provide a detailed framework to help strategic leaders to understand the complexity of various military missions and how to structure and tailor a command concept to manage operations in a Volatile, Uncertain,
Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) environment. 29 
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Charles B. Perrow is not, by any means, the only complex systems theorist.
However, he is one of the first to attempt to frame complex systems, and therefore his theories are very broad and applicable to many environments. Subsequent researchers have focused on the most complex systems without studying systems that do not apply directly to industry or safety. 30 Therefore, using Perrow as a base will allow this paper to develop a framework that will translate to military command concepts.
In Perrow's Organization Systems Theory, a "system" can refer to almost anything; a unit, a population, a business, an operation, or even an operational
environment. An operations may be a single system, or a group of multible subsystems, each with a different set of characteristics. In Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, Dr. Perrow explains how complex systems can be plotted by the way they interact and how they are coupled. 31 
Coupling
Coupling refers to the way components (parts, units, and sub-systems) within a system react to each other. 32 In a tightly coupled system there is no slack between components. Each component directly affects the component adjacent to it. An internal combustion engine is an example of a tightly coupled system, where each part directly acts with the parts around it, and if one part changes or fails there is an immediate reaction to those changes with the other parts. A fish in an aquarium is an example of a loosely coupled system. Occasionally fish interact with other fish, at other times they do not. If one fish dies, it may take a while before the other fish notice.
Interaction
Interaction refers to the parts, or components, in that system and how they react to one another. Linear Interaction describes components that react in a predictable way Figure 4 shows a Perrow Interaction/Coupling graph. 33 The Y axis represents the scale of coupling from Loose to Tight, and the X axis the interaction, from linear to complex. This graph is divided into four quadrants, each with its own characteristics.
For this example, the quadrants are named the Engineering, Craftwork, Complicated, and Splintered Quadrants. Systems within the Engineering Quadrant most resemble the concept of systems as a machine. 34 An example for this might be an assembly line or a Basic Combat Training company. There may be different ways to operate these systems, but there are only a 12 few that work really well. Detailed planning is effective because the predicable interaction of the various components and their tight coupling make the problem obvious. Command and Control's primary input during execution is to make adjustments when something breaks down or gets in the way. If something is changed it is obvious because the tight coupling lends to rapid feedback. Because of the tight coupling, the system is at risk of failure should one or more components fail.
However, the quick feedback loop helps make the systems predicable and amenable to an engineering solution.
Craftwork Quadrant A loosely coupled system consisting of linear interactions is least likely to encounter catastrophic failure. The linear interactions of its components make it somewhat predictable, although less so than the Engineering Quadrant, and the loose coupling affords the slack to recover from setbacks and discover new solutions. An example here would be a custom motorcycle shop, where a product-the motorcyclethat might normally be made on a time-sensitive and controlled assembly line is instead carefully crafted by artist-mechanics who loosely follow schedules and procedures to create a one-of-a-kind machine. Engineered solutions and centralized control will still work, but may not result in the desired product the way a Designed solution and decentralized control--allowing subordinates the freedom to invent their own solutions--would.
Splintered Quadrant
A Loosely Coupled system with Complex Interactions results in unpredictable effects and the quintessential environment of unintended consequences. 35 Operations in the Splintered Quadrant require a decentralized and adaptive approach to operations. compounding the problem. The paradox is that the complex interactions could be solved by using a decentralized approach, but the tight coupling cause rapid cascading of effects throughout the system that require Detailed Command. Perrow claims that the complex, tightly coupled systems in this region will--at some point--fail, such as the Challenger space shuttle disaster in 1986. In this example, policies at NASA led to 14 mission leaders launching the shuttle in cold weather even though several subordinates were convinced it was too risky for launch, but could not adequately express their concerns because the extreme complexity of the system defied prediction.
Unfortunately, the cold weather led to a failure in a rubber O-ring that caused cascading effects resulting in the explosion of a solid rocket booster and destruction of the shuttle.
Another example of a complicated systems failure Perrow studied is the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident in 1979. An initial failure in a non-nuclear secondary system was followed by a stuck-open valve in the primary system, which then allowed large amounts of nuclear reactor coolant to escape. The mechanical failures were compounded by the failure of plant operators to recognize the loss-ofcoolant accident due to inadequate training, human factors, and control room design
flaws. An example is a hidden indicator light that led to a manual override of the automatic emergency cooling system because operators incorrectly believed there was too much (when there was in fact too little) coolant water present.
In both of these examples, the tremendous complexity of the systems seems to require both a centralized and decentralized command approach; centralized command to ensure personnel adhere to correct policies and procedures, and decentralized command to ensure subordinates have authority to take appropriate emergency action.
In fact, the organization and systems require both centralized and decentralized command. Organizations that operate well, even if they experience setbacks within this realm, are known as High Reliability Organizations (HRO). 36 They are able to mitigate the risk by training and education, maximizing systems feedback, and a high degree of flexibility. HROs allow subordinates to take action, but ensure they coordinate with a 15 centralized authority to ensure the action taken in one system does not adversely affect adjacent systems.
Time and Planning Horizons in Complex Systems
Time is not a determining factor on where an operation will fall within the 
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The better way to measure a system is by temporal horizons. The planning horizon will take the operation thru to fruition, whether that is measured in hours (a raid) or years (a campaign). The tempo of the feedback loop will be long or short in relation to the overall temporal horizon and based on how tightly coupled the system is.
Perrow Interaction/Coupling and Military Applications Figure 6 is a variant of a Perrow systems interaction and coupling graph divided into the same four quadrants, but with a selection of combat operations plotted where they might fall on this scale. Of course, the exact placement of these could be argued
indefinitely. There are thousands of variations operations that could, under various circumstances, plot in an entirely different quadrant.
Within a campaign, specific operations can be plotted in this graph to give commanders and staffs an idea of where the operation falls within the system and what command concept style would best be used to achieve success. Unfortunately, the realism of the exercise, coupled with deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union caused Soviet leaders to believe that NATO was preparing a preemptive nuclear first strike, and they placed their nuclear forces on alert.
Military Operations in the Engineering
Events that followed over the next few weeks could have easily caused a nuclear exchange and Able Archer was possibly the closest the world has come to Nuclear War. The Command and Control Concepts used during a military campaign should vary based on the system environment that the command is operating in. Because a campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space, commanders shouldn't consider 20 they can use the same command concept throughout the campaign. 39 Each operation is both a system unto itself and also a component of the larger system that encompasses the entire campaign.
Campaign designers and military planners at all levels should evaluate each operation to determine the interaction and coupling, and decide which command concept should be used (Figure 7) . For example, a counter insurgency, as already noted, will mostly rest in the Splintered Quadrant. However, operations within the overall campaign may fit in any of the Perrow quadrants, and will likely span quadrants at different levels of command. The concept of the Art of Command in these publications seems to match the concept of Mission Command as defined by this paper and past Army Doctrine.
Likewise, the Science of Control concept matches Detailed Command. 44 Developing a model that determines how military operations relate to art and science will assist commanders in applying command concepts to best meet demands on the battlefield.
In current doctrine, the Science of Control is defined as the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to synchronize and integrate actions. It is based on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis. The Science of Control is used to overcome physical and procedural constraints, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, rules of engagement, and legal considerations. The
Science of Control is used to understand things that can be analyzed and measured; in other words, how systems and components are coupled in a linear system.
45
The Art of Command, in current doctrine, is used to deal with the unpredictability of human behavior and how human endeavors are characterized by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants. is inculcated into the Army's collective mental framework, leaders at all levels will understand when and why they Detailed Command should be used, when they should use Mission Command, and when they must use a hybrid of both.
Using multiple Command and Control concepts will streamline operations, which currently have a Command and Control identity crisis. The Army must eliminate the confusion a commander may have when thinking with mission command, while the higher headquarters is giving specific and Detailed Command. However, the Army will achieve more efficiency, synchronization, and synergy by developing in Mission Command doctrine a model that enables leaders to understand how to apply Command and Control techniques to fit the systems environment. Commanders will understand that it is better to use Detailed Command in a particular phase or task to create unity of effort and maximized synchronization. In other areas of the operation, using Mission
Command will enable the synergy that a less centralized command and control creates. 2 Ibid, v. 
